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 
Abstract— Cyber threats traditionally target governments, 
financial institutions and businesses.  However, of growing 
concern is the threat to healthcare organizations.  This 
study conducts a cyber security risk assessment of a 
theoretical hospital environment, to include TLS/SSL, 
which is an encryption protocol for network 
communications, plus other physical, logical and human 
threats.  Despite significant budgets in the UK for the NHS, 
the spend on cyber security appears worryingly low and 
many hospitals are wide open to attack. This paper 
concludes that major change, led nationally by the UK 
government, is needed to make cyber security a major 
priority in the NHS, without diluting long-standing values 
of service provision to patients.  
 
Index Terms— health information management, hospitals, 
information security, network security, public healthcare, risk 
analysis, security. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
n 2015 a Sophos survey found the NHS was the biggest 
victim in the UK of data breaches [13].  Previous attacks on 
hospitals have caused cancelled operations [12], and more 
than sixty UK cyber incidents led to personal data breaches in 
2015 [1].  In the US, hospitals have been shut down by hackers 
demanding ransoms [2] and it is said that health-care data is 
worth up to twenty times the value of credit card details [3]. 
Furthermore, recent media coverage highlighted the lack of 
spend in the UK by the NHS on cybersecurity [1] and the 
resulting risk to patients and their sensitive personal data.  Out-
of-date TLS/SSL implementations were discovered.  Hence it 
was decided to research more closely the cyber threats in this 
specific healthcare environment via a risk assessment.  It is felt 
this underspend is not due to budget constraints, but perhaps 
because security studies thus far have been insufficient to 
generate a sound argument for negotiating larger, more 
impactful sums of money.  Public opinion influences 
government to focus on traditional patient care and service 
delivery issues rather than the difficult area of cyber security.  
By the time the public at large falls victim to a serious attack, it 
will be too late.  
In this paper a risk assessment is conducted using ISO 
27005:2011 [5], a standard for Information Security Risk 
Management, and we reference the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-
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37r1 [11], which contains the NIST Risk Management 
Framework (RMF).  The NIST RMF is a US standard for risk 
assessment for federal systems.  With the stakes high in 
healthcare, these stringent federal standards are considered 
relevant to this analysis.  Our study includes TLS/SSL and we 
reference the TLS attacks and mitigations detailed in the 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) RFC7457 [6].  The 
terms TLS and SSL are interchangeable in this paper.  Studying 
the full list of TLS vulnerabilities is excessive – over three 
hundred results can found by searching for the TLS keyword on 
the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) online 
database [10].  This study is limited to four pages plus 
appendices, so it not possible to be exhaustive. 
II. SYSTEM OUTLINE – A THEORETICAL HOSPITAL IT 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
The focus of this risk assessment is hospital IT 
infrastructure to include both traditional system components 
but also emerging components which, as they become more 
commonplace, cause the size of the attack surface to increase.  
We make a number of assertions, including the use of 
TLS/SSL.   In-house applications are web-based and accessed 
via single sign-on over a client-server connection and traffic is 
handled via middleware which uses an implementation of 
TLS/SSL.  Internet of Things (IoT) device to server 
communications are also encrypted using TLS/SSL.  IoT 
devices can be anything connected the web.  Examples of 
these include surveillance cameras to track patients, medical 
devices used by doctors, and also patient devices like 
pacemakers or insulin pumps controllable by web interfaces.  
Portable devices like tablets and mobile phones are used.  
Patient wellbeing is monitored by wireless and wired systems.  
A database is hosted in the cloud with patient information and 
a Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) system, where phone 
communications are passed over the web, is used throughout 
the hospital with TLS/SSL encrypting those communications. 
There are system usage constraints concerning personnel, 
depending on their role and various legal requirements exist 
that require sensitive personal data to be securely processed 
and stored.  This paper will not detail each piece of legislation 
a hospital has to adhere to, suffice to say the legal and 
regulatory obligations are significant.   
A detailed information security risk assessment was carried 
out on this system using ISO 27005:2011[5].  We identify 
threats to critical system assets, assign values related to both 
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the consequences of an attack and its likelihood, in order to 
calculate a risk value, or measure of risk, for each threat.  The 
threats are then ranked by risk value and risk treatment takes 
place accordingly.  Fig. 1 below shows this Risk Management 
Process, as defined in [5]. 
 
Figure 1 – The ISO 27005:2011 risk management process 
 
The NIST Risk Management Framework (RMF) shown in 
Appendix E and described in [11] is also useful, and this paper 
refers to it from time to time. 
III.  CONTEXT ESTABLISHMENT 
The mission of the NHS in England includes providing 
“health and high quality care for all” [4].  Implied in this, and 
also a reasonable public expectation, is that patients are safe 
and secure when in hospital, as is their medical data. 
Firstly, the basic criteria of the assessment need specified.  
These are the Risk Evaluation criteria, Impact criteria and 
Risk Acceptance criteria.  There is some overlap nevertheless 
this is an important early step to ensure thoroughness.   
 
1) Risk Evaluation Criteria -  risks will be evaluated 
considering:  the strategic value of a given information 
process, how critical is a given asset, legal obligations, 
stakeholder expectations, negative impact on reputation and 
the importance of Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability 
(CIA), authorization, authentication and non-repudiation. 
 
2) Impact Criteria – impact of a security event will be 
evaluated considering:  financial cost to the organization, 
effect on business operations, patient risk, reputation damage, 
legal ramifications and breaches of CIA, authorization, 
authentication and non-repudiation. There are correlations 
here between these impact criteria and the NIST RMF, where 
a system is categorized to determine its impact level.  Each 
data source is analysed for impact of losses of CIA, 
authorization, authentication, availability and non-repudiation.  
The highest impact level from these factors is assigned to that 
data source, and then the highest impact level of all data 
sources is assigned to the whole system, which feeds into 
countermeasure selection in the other stages. 
  
3) Risk Acceptance Criteria – consider business criteria, legal 
and regulatory aspects, operational, technology, financial and 
social factors.  For example, all low-grade risks could be 
accepted. 
Secondly, the scope and boundaries need defined.  Our 
scope includes any IT infrastructure mentioned in the system 
outline, any elements required for them to operate and any 
process that requires access to patient data.  All assets related 
to patient data are within scope since stakeholders would 
expect this end-to-end consideration.  
Thirdly, an internal business group for information security 
risk management needs set up.  This defines roles, develops a 
risk management process, identifies stakeholders and defines 
escalation though it is not immediately relevant to this study. 
IV.  RISK IDENTIFICATION PART 1– ASSETS & CONSEQUENCES 
Here we identify what causes a potential loss – how it 
happens, where it happens and why it happens.  The assets 
within our scope need be identified.  An asset is anything that 
has value to the organization and needs protection.  This 
process results in a list of critical system assets to be risk-
managed.  These assets underpin primary hospital information, 
processes and activities.  If critical system assets are 
compromised, then these processes and activities fail or 
degrade.  For example, patient operations are cancelled, 
monitoring of vital signs interrupted, or administrative 
functions slowed.   
Values are placed on assets relative to the consequences of 
a security incident.  The terms asset value and consequence 
value are interchangeable.  These consequences are disclosure 
(preservation of confidentiality), modification (preservation of 
integrity, authenticity, non-repudiation and accountability), 
non-availability, and destruction (preservation of availability 
and reliability).  Replacement cost is also a factor, as are 
dependencies, where the more important or numerous the 
business processes supported by an asset, the greater the asset 
value.  Finally, the impact criteria defined in the previous 
section are also considered when deciding this valuation.  For 
the asset and consequence valuation we use a scale of 1-5, 
where 1 = negligible, 2 = low, 3 = medium, 4 = high and 5 = 
critical. 
A high level view of the system components from an 
attacker’s point of view can be seen in Appendix A, and the 
full list of critical system assets can be found in Appendix B.  
Already at this stage we are undertaking some risk analysis, 
since we are assessing the consequences and assigning values 
accordingly. 
The assets are placed in one of four categories – data, 
hardware, software, and network.  It could be argued that 
patient data, which is anything that can identify an individual 
patient and all sensitive personal data relating to them and 
their wellbeing, is of utmost importance, though here are three 
more examples: 
 
1) TLS/SSL protocol (Network) – as shown in Appendix A, the 
use of TLS/SSL is considerable, handling web and network 
traffic, IoT communications, and SIP encryption for VoIP.  
Considering the consequences of a successful attack on this 
protocol, we can say disclosure, violation of legislation, loss 
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of trust, personal information breaches, system non-
availability, data modification and data destruction are all 
possible.  So, along with the considerable other assets that rely 
on this protocol, it is valued at 5, or critical.  
 
2) Patient IoT devices (Hardware) – these are, for example, 
pacemakers and insulin pumps, which are connected to the 
network for monitoring and automation.  If these are attacked, 
then there is a risk of patient death, data modification, system 
non-availability and they are expensive to replace.  Hence this 
asset is also valued at 5, or critical.  
 
3) USB sticks (Hardware) – if they were the target of an 
attack, and contained sensitive personal data, this is open to 
disclosure and modification.  There is no direct threat to 
patient life, and there are few, if any, other assets that rely on a 
USB stick.  They are also not expensive to replace if rendered 
unusable.  So they are given a value of 3, or medium. 
V.  RISK IDENTIFICATION PART 2 – THREATS & 
VULNERABILITIES  
The next step is identifying threats and their sources to define 
the overall attack surface.  Threats potentially harm assets and 
can be deliberate, accidental, internal and external.  It is useful 
to consider threat catalogues from 3rd parties, such as Annex C 
in [5].  The threat scenario list for our hospital system can be 
found in Appendix C.  These scenarios implicitly contain 
vulnerability details, so vulnerability identification was not 
treated as a completely separate step.  There are three main 
types of threat - physical, logical and human: 
 
1) Physical threats – target physical system components, like 
unauthorized tampering and modification of a device.  For 
example, if an attacker gains physical access to an IoT device 
via a USB port, then malicious firmware could be installed, or 
some physical functions disabled, or the device itself simply 
damaged beyond repair. 
 
2) Logical threats – target software or the system.  This includes 
vulnerabilities with TLS.  For example, if TLS is used with 
most non-Diffie-Hellman cipher suites, it is possible to obtain 
the server’s private key to decrypt any session.  Or Denial of 
Service (DoS) attacks can occur where malicious groups of 
clients called botnets can take a target offline.  IoT devices are 
particularly vulnerable as they are resource constrained with 
limited memory and battery power.  The logical threats of an 
attack surface can be considerable so if needed they can be 
categorized as per guidance from the Open Web Application 
Security Project (OWASP) [14].  These categories are: 
login/authentication points, admin interfaces, data entry forms, 
valuable data itself, files from outside the network and lastly 
security code related to encryption, access control and session 
management. 
 
3) Human threats – [5] states particular attention should be paid 
to human threats.  Insider threats are the most difficult to defend 
against.  They can be manifested as poorly trained, malicious, 
negligent, or terminated employees committing computer 
abuse, theft, using malicious code, selling information and 
gaining unauthorized system access.  Human threats can also 
originate from hackers trying to get data for illegal disclosure 
or terrorists attacking specific medical devices connected to 
patients with risk of death - there were patents processed in 
2013 for insulin pumps which can be controlled from web 
interfaces [7] and in 2008, doctors disabled the wireless 
capability in a US politician’s pacemaker to thwart 
assassination attempts [8].    
VI.  RISK ANALYSIS & RISK EVALUATION  
To rank the threats in Appendix C for risk treatment, the risk 
value or measure of risk is needed.  This is calculated as 
follows: 
Measure of Risk = Consequence (or Asset) value x 
Likelihood 
When valuing likelihood, thought needs given to how often 
a threat may occur, the effort and technical skill needed, and the 
possible impact, all of which form an important part of the risk 
analysis.  We shall use values from 1-5, where 1 = very 
unlikely, 2 = unlikely, 3 = possible, 4 = likely and 5 = very 
likely.  The estimated occurrence rates are relative to each other.  
One hospital may only have an attempt made to hack its Wi-Fi 
once a month, but if it happens to one hundred hospitals, every 
month, then we can say it is regular.  The full list of threat 
scenarios with likelihoods can be seen in Appendix C.  Three 
examples are: 
1) TLS threat scenarios – to exploit these, considerable 
technical knowledge or computing power is required compared 
to, say, spreading malware via phishing emails.  So the 
estimated occurrence rate of most of these is ‘rarely’, the ease 
of exploit ‘hard’ and the likelihood 1, or very unlikely.  The 
exception is threat scenario 15.10 for implementation issues 
which are much easier to exploit compared to direct flaws in the 
TLS protocol. 
2) Email misuse, either deliberate or accidental by an insider – 
for example sending documents without security protection, or 
emailing a large number of recipients deliberately with 
malicious intent.  Since not a lot of technical skill is required 
and email is used daily by hospital staff, we can say the rate of 
occurrence is ‘very frequently’, the ease of exploit ‘easy’ and 
therefore logically the likelihood is 5, very likely. 
3) Attempting to kill or harm patients through terrorist or 
political motivations by attacking implanted IoT devices – a 
successful attack like this has not been reported, though there 
may well have been failed attempts.  It is an attractive option to 
a terrorist attacker.  The technical nous required is considerable, 
therefore the rate of occurrence is ‘rarely’, the ease of exploit 
‘hard’, and we say the likelihood as 2, unlikely. 
Using the aforementioned equation, we can quickly 
determine risk values and rank the threats to continue the risk 
analysis.  The table showing the final ranked threats in order 
of priority can be found in Appendix D.   
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VII.  RISK TREATMENT 
Four options exist for risk treatment – risk modification 
using controls, risk retention, risk avoidance and risk sharing.   
Controls are selected in order to reduce risks to an 
acceptable level, known as residual risk. These controls are 
listed in Appendix D.  Risk retention accepts risks as per the 
acceptance criteria specified in the context establishment.   
Our focus in this paper is solely the high-priority risks with 
a risk value of 20 or higher.  There are however interesting 
evaluations that can be made for lower priority risks.  For 
example, the threat of death to patients through IoT implanted 
device tampering sounds severe but when evaluated the 
likelihood is so low that the risk is accepted as the technical 
skill needed is significant.  From reviewing the threat 
scenarios in Appendix C, risk avoidance, where activities that 
create risks should be removed, and risk sharing, where the 
risk is outsourced to a 3rd party for handling, are not required.  
The controls selected should be based on a cost/benefit ratio 
unless a risk is particularly severe, in which case economic 
grounds are less important.  If the NIST approach is followed 
to the letter, there is a list of minimum controls for high 
impact systems like ours.  Controls were picked from the 
families listed in [11], a summary of which forms Appendix F.  
Detailing every required NIST control would be excessive.   
The full list of selected controls for high-priority risks can 
be found in Appendix D, including those relating to the 
implementation of TLS/SSL.  The TLS vulnerabilities were 
compiled from [6], which details specific mitigations.  In our 
risk assessment, the highest ranked TLS threat arose from 
implementation, which historically has been the case, for 
example with the Heartbleed bug in OpenSSL.  We will not 
reprint all the non-implementation based mitigations here, 
though some key ones are disabling TLS compression to 
prevent TIME attacks, and ensuring use of cipher suites that 
offer forward secrecy, where revealing a private key does not 
expose past or future sessions to a passive attacker.   Three 
examples of controls from Appendix D are given below: 
 
1) Theft of information from database by an insider – 
removing temporary or emergency accounts (which may have 
weaker passwords) reduces entry points for an insider without 
credentials, as does automatic lock out after the threshold for 
unsuccessful logon attempts has been reached, either from 
manual or brute-force attempts.  Security training reduces the 
likelihood of information theft by abuse of unattended PCs, 
and citizenship requirements for access, whilst controversial, 
may be effective.  Tools can be used for monitoring network 
traffic for signs of information theft, and certain sites with a 
history of posting of stolen data can be monitored, although 
that doesn’t directly prevent the initial insider theft. 
2) Wi-Fi hacking – this supports many other assets, as per 
Appendix A.  Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) create alerts 
when a compromise has taken place.  Wireless link protection 
prevents the network being taken down by electromagnetic 
signal interference.  Physical access controls prevent 
tampering with hardware, whilst encryption is important with 
older protocols like WEP being vastly inferior and easy to 
crack compared to standards like AES. 
3) Malware installation – security awareness training with 
practical exercises about handling suspicious emails (a major 
source of malware) and the threat of social engineering 
strengthens front-line defences.  Least privilege and least 
functionality prevent program execution.  Alerts can be setup 
for unauthorized software installation, and monitoring 
communications traffic means that unusual behavior, like 
spikes in outbound traffic caused by malware, can be detected. 
Controls need reviewed regularly.  Over time, the capability 
of attackers increases, like the example concerning medical 
IoT implanted devices.  The monitoring of risks has to take 
place iteratively to account for changes in assets, the 
organization, the law, or the emergence of new vulnerabilities 
and threats.  As per Fig. 1, communication and consultation 
also take place iteratively.   
Estimated costs have been assigned to the countermeasures 
for the high-priority risks.  Higher costs tend to be associated 
with extra physical protection, however low cost 
countermeasures are no less important.  They involve 
combining a lot of granular controls to benefit from synergy. 
For example, combing security training, removing default 
accounts, monitoring network traffic and unsuccessful logins, 
citizenship requirements and dealing with terminated 
employee access can be combined to mitigate insider threats.  
Individually, these are not expensive controls, relative to, say, 
24-hour surveillance of servers and network infrastructure.   
VIII.  CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK 
The threat to human life is the ultimate threat.  The 
government budget for NHS England for 2016-20 is upwards 
of £100billion annually.  The average spend for an NHS trust 
in 2015 was £20,000[1].  Hence there is a major underspend 
and the cost of countermeasures should not ultimately prevent 
implementation.  Therefore, the threshold for ruling out 
countermeasures or delaying implementation for financial 
reasons should be higher than that of other sectors.  Our threat 
mitigation strategy is that all the controls identified in 
Appendix C should be implemented.  Threats arising from use 
of poor implementations of TLS/SSL are significant but can 
be mitigated by a collection of low-cost steps as we have 
outlined, again in Appendix C. 
For future work we would like to investigate occurrences of 
out-of-date TLS/SSL use and server certificates across the 
NHS to build a detailed proof-of-concept vulnerability picture.  
In the 2016-17 mandate to NHS England from the Department 
of Health, there is only one objective related to cyber security 
which reads “Robust data security standards in place and 
being enforced for patient confidential data” [9].  This level of 
detail is inadequate and serious change is required to bring 
cyber security to the very top of the agenda in the NHS, 
without sacrificing the delivery of patient care. 
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Appendix A – High level view of hospital system components from an attacker’s perspective 
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Appendix B – Critical System Assets including valuation (1 = negligible, 2 = low, 3 = medium, 4 = high and 5 = critical) 
 
Category Asset Comments / Considerations / Key Consequences 
Asset AKA 
Consequence 
Valuation Last Reviewed 
Data Patient Data 
Anything that can identify an individual patient and all sensitive 
personal data relating to that patient, either for identifying them, or in 
relation to any aspect of their health and wellbeing.  Disclosure, 
modification and destruction. 5 13/12/2016 
Hardware Client PCs 
Impaired business performance through non-availability, disclosure and 
modification. 4 13/12/2016 
Hardware Server Farm 
Impaired business performance through non-availability, disclosure, 
modification and cost of replacement. 5 13/12/2016 
Hardware Portable devices 
Laptops, mobile phones, tablets, etc.  Disclosure, modification and non-
availability. 3 13/12/2016 
Hardware Medical devices 
Independent devices for patient data collection, not connected to the 
network.  Disclosure, modification and cost of replacement. 4 13/12/2016 
Hardware External hard disks Disclosure, modification, non-availability. 3 13/12/2016 
Hardware USBs Disclosure and modification. 3 13/12/2016 
Hardware Patient IoT Devices 
For example, pacemakers, insulin pumps, possibly drips.  These are 
treatment devices connected to the network.  Personal safety, risk of 
death, modification, non-availability and cost of replacement. 5 13/12/2016 
Hardware Other IoT Devices 
For example, surveillance cameras, IoT devices specifically for patient 
data collection which are connected to the network 4 13/12/2016 
Software Cloud Database 
Non-availability, disclosure, violation of legislation, loss of trust, 
personal information breach, data modification and destruction are key 
consequences. 5 13/12/2016 
Software CRM software 
Non-availability, impaired business performance, disclosure and data 
modification are key consequences. 3 13/12/2016 
Software Middleware 
This impacts a lot of other system assets.  Disclosure, modification and 
non-availability are key consequences. 5 13/12/2016 
Software VoIP software 
Disclosure of data, conversations and non-availability are key 
consequences. 3 13/12/2016 
Software Email system Disclosure, modification, non-availability 4 13/12/2016 
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Software 
Operating Systems on 
client PCs and servers Non-availability, disclosure and modification. 3 13/12/2016 
Software 
All other 3rd party / 
COTS software Non-availability, disclosure and modification. 3 13/12/2016 
Software 
TLS/SSL 
implementation 
For example, OpenSSL for electronic messaging using cryptography.  
Implementations are classified as software as per ISO 27000:2011.  
Non-availability, disclosure, violation of legislation, loss of trust, 
personal information breach, data modification, destruction of data. 5 13/12/2016 
Network Network infrastructure 
Like switches and routers. Non-availability, disclosure, violation of 
legislation, loss of trust, personal information breach, data modification 
and destruction are key consequences. 5 13/12/2016 
Network Ethernet Connections 
Carries data encrypted by TLS/SSL over a physical wire.  Non-
availability, disclosure, violation of legislation, loss of trust, personal 
information breach, data modification and destruction are key 
consequences.   5 13/12/2016 
Network TLS/SSL protocol 
Non-availability, disclosure, violation of legislation, loss of trust, 
personal information breach, data modification and destruction are key 
consequences. 5 13/12/2016 
Network Wi-Fi 
Carries data encrypted by TLS/SSL using wireless protocols.  Non-
availability, disclosure, violation of legislation, loss of trust, personal 
information breach, data modification and destruction are key 
consequences. 5 13/12/2016 
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Appendix C – Threat scenarios, including estimated occurrence rate, ease of exploit and likelihood value (1 = very unlikely, 2 = unlikely, 3 = possible, 4 = likely and 5 = 
very likely)    
 
Threat 
type 
Threat 
ID Scenario Details 
Estimated 
Occurrence 
Rate 
Ease of 
Exploit Likelihood 
Physical 1 
IoT device tampering via USB port, applies to relevant patient IoT devices and 
others IoT devices. Rarely Medium 3 
Physical 2 Unauthorised access to server room and network hardware. Occasionally Easy 5 
Physical 3 Tampering with medical devices not connected to network. Occasionally Easy 4 
Physical 4 
Side-channel timing attack on the middleware and hardware that is performing 
encryption for TLS/SSL in order to deduce keys. Occasionally Hard 2 
Physical 5 Wi-Fi signal jamming. Occasionally Medium 3 
Physical 6 Network tap or full duplex devices installed between host and switch. Rarely Hard 1 
Logical 7 
Packet capturing tools used to intercept and log network traffic.  Traffic captured 
at host, or port mirroring (copying all traffic to or from a user port to an attacker’s 
port). Occasionally Hard 5 
Logical 8 
Active attacks: replay attack, message modification Man-In-The-Middle (MITM), 
Denial of Service (DoS), masquerade (spoofing source IP address) Occasionally Medium 3 
Logical 9 
Passive attacks: eavesdrop to get message contents, traffic analysis (subtle, even 
with encryption), studying metadata. Occasionally Easy 5 
Logical 10 
Network threats and attacks – actual session hijacking e.g. MITM 
Rarely Medium 3 
Logical 11 
Access to web interfaces that are left public, when they should be private, to 
misuse system components.  Like a User Interface detailing patient information or 
to control a medical device. Occasionally Easy 3 
Logical 12 
Wi-Fi hacking – where the wireless network is hacked in order to sniff traffic or 
carry out other malicious activity. 
Very 
frequently Easy 5 
Logical 13 
Brute force attacks using computer power to try password variations on web-
facing logins to gain access. Regularly Easy 5 
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Logical 14  Malware installation, e.g. by phishing emails / social engineering 
Very 
frequently Easy 5 
Logical 15.1 
TLS - SSL stripping – where HTTP traffic and HTML pages are modified on the 
wire.  Only effective on the web if the client initially accesses a webserver using 
HTTP.  All the traffic from the victim’s machine is routed via a proxy the attacker 
creates.  This is a MITM attack where the communications become plain text 
which is sniffable, and information can be collected.  Instead of accessing 
https://site.com, a user accesses http://site.com.  So if using our intranet, which is 
protected by TLS, then the attacker could for example sniff traffic and gain 
sensitive personal data. Rarely Hard 2 
Logical 15.2 
TLS - STARTTLS command injection attack (CVE-2011-0411) – this command 
upgrades a cleartext connection to use TLS.  However, the application layer input 
buffer can retain commands that were pipelined with the STARTTLS command.  
If they are malicious commands, then the results could be serious. Rarely Hard 2 
Logical 15.3 
TLS - BEAST (Browser Exploit Against SSL/TLS) attack (CVE-2011-3389) – 
there are problems with the TLS 1.0 implementation of Cipher Block Chaining 
(CBC) to decrypt parts of a packet and decrypt HTTP cookies when HTTP is run 
over TLS.  It allows attackers to silently decrypt data that is passing between a 
webserver and an end-user browser. Rarely Hard 2 
Logical 15.4 
TLS - Attacks on RC4 – RC4 is a cipher used with TLS for many years.  It has 
cryptographic weaknesses though.  Recent cryptanalysis studies exploit biases in 
the RC4 keystream to recover repeatedly encrypted plaintexts.  These results are 
close to being practically exploitable – as of Feb 2015 they require 2^26 sessions 
or 13x2^30 encryptions.  So they are feasible but not practical due to the amount 
of traffic needed to mount the attacks.  RC4 is no longer seen as providing a 
sufficient level of security for TLS sessions.    Rarely Hard 2 
Logical 15.5 
TLS - Compression Attacks: CRIME (CVE-2012-4929), TIME and BREACH – 
CRIME allows an attacker to decrypt ciphertext (specifically cookies), when TLS 
is used with TLS-level compression.  TIME and BREACH attacks are similar 
when TLS is used with http-level compression.   
Rarely Hard 2 
Logical 15.6 
TLS - Certificate and RSA-related attacks – using RSA certs means exploitable 
timing issues Rarely Hard 2 
Logical 15.7 
TLS - Theft of RSA private keys – if TLS is used with most non-Diffie-Hellman 
cipher suites, it is possible to obtain the server’s private key to decrypt any 
session.  Wireshark does this to inspect TLS-protected connections.   Rarely Hard 2 
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Logical 15.8 
TLS - Renegotiation (CVE-2009-3555) – a major attack on the TLS renegotiation 
mechanism applies to all current versions of the protocol.  Here the attacker forms 
a TLS connection with the target server, injects content of their choice, then 
splices in new TLS connection from a client, which is treated as a renegotiation, 
and the server believes the initial data transmitted by the attacker is from the same 
entity as the subsequent client data.  Rarely Hard 2 
Logical 15.9 
TLS - Denial of Service – malicious clients and groups of clients called botnets 
can mount denial-of-service attacks.  Particularly with regard IoT devices, since 
they are resource constrained devices, which makes them easier to attack and also 
easier to create a botnet from. Occasionally Easy 2 
Logical 15.10 
TLS - Implementation issues – even when TLS is properly specified, the 
implementation can be incorrect, for example there are well known issues with 
OpenSSL, such as Heartbleed.  The implementations can omit validating server 
certificates for example. Occasionally Easy 4 
Human 16 Theft of information from database by an insider. Occasionally Easy 5 
Human 17 Theft of mobile devices or other digital media by an insider. Occasionally Easy 5 
Human 18 Email misuse, either deliberate or accidental by an insider. 
Very 
frequently Easy 5 
Human 19 Deliberate or accidental tampering with of non-network connected devices. Occasionally Easy 5 
Human   
Accidental or deliberate spreading of malware from USB drives, external HDs etc 
that infect a client which then infects the network. Occasionally Easy 5 
Human 20 Unauthorised access to servers. Rarely Easy 5 
Human 21 Accidental or deliberate information disclosure. 
Very 
frequently Easy 5 
Human 22 
Attempt to kill or harm patients through terrorist or political motivations by 
affecting implanted IoT devices. Rarely Hard 1 
Human 23 
Unauthorised system access from a hacker to gain information for financial gain, 
illegal information disclosure or destroying records. Rarely Medium 3 
Human 24 Industrial espionage for some economic benefit. Rarely Medium 1 
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Appendix D – Threat scenario ranking including risk value, controls and cost 
 
Threat 
ID 
Consequence
/Asset Value Likelihood 
Risk 
Value 
Threat 
Ranking Scenario Details Controls Cost 
2 5 5 25 1 
Unauthorised access to 
server room and 
network hardware 
Physical Access Authorizations:  Access by 
position/role, restrict unescorted access.  
Physical Access Control: Continuous 
alarms/monitoring, lockable casings, tamper 
protection.  Monitoring Physical Access: 
intrusion alarms/surveillance equipment, 
video surveillance, monitoring physical 
access to information systems. High 
7 5 5 25 1 
Packet capturing tools 
used to intercept and 
log network traffic.  
Traffic captured at 
host, or port mirroring 
(copying all traffic to 
or from a user port to 
an attacker’s port). 
Boundary protection:  Protects against 
unauthorized physical connections.  
Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity: 
cryptographic and physical protection. 
Information System Monitoring:  Automated 
response to suspicious events Medium 
9 5 5 25 1 
Passive attacks: 
eavesdrop to get 
message contents, 
traffic analysis (subtle, 
even with encryption), 
studying metadata. 
Boundary protection:  Protects against 
unauthorized physical connections.  
Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity: 
cryptographic and physical protection. 
Information System Monitoring:  Automated 
response to suspicious events Medium 
12 5 5 25 1 
Wi-Fi hacking – where 
the wireless network is 
hacked in order to 
sniff traffic or carry 
out other malicious 
activity. 
Information System Monitoring: Wireless 
Intrusion Detection, system-wide intrusion 
detection system.  Wireless Link Protection:  
against electromagnetic interference, reduce 
detection potential.   Physical Access 
Control: Lockable cases, tamper protection.  
Wireless Access:  Authentication and 
encryption (ensure WEP is not used, prefer 
AES.), monitor unauthorised connections, 
restrict configuration by users, antennas / 
transmission power levels High 
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16 5 5 25 1 
Theft of information 
from database by an 
insider. 
Account Management: Removal of 
temporary / emergency accounts, inactivity 
logout, account monitoring, disable accounts 
for high-risk individuals.  Unsuccessful 
Logon Attempts: Automatic account lock.  
Previous Logon Notification:  Successful / 
unsuccessful logons.  Remote Access: 
monitoring for unauthorized connections.  
Security Awareness Training: Insider threat.  
Information System Monitoring:  System-
wide intrusion detection system.  Analyse 
communications traffic anomalies.  
Maintenance Personnel: control access from 
individuals without appropriate access.  
Citizenship requirements for classified 
systems.  Identification and authentication 
policy and procedures:  ensure vigilance for 
organisational users and those external to the 
organisation also.  Monitoring for 
information disclosure:  use of automated 
tools, review of monitored sites. Low 
20 5 5 25 1 
Unauthorised access to 
servers. 
Physical Access Authorizations:  Access by 
position/role, restrict unescorted access.  
Physical Access Control: Continuous 
alarms/monitoring, lockable casings, tamper 
protection.  Monitoring Physical Access: 
intrusion alarms/surveillance equipment, 
video surveillance, monitoring physical 
access to information systems. High 
21 5 5 25 1 
Accidental or 
deliberate information 
disclosure. 
Access Enforcement: role-based access 
control.  Revocation of access authorizations.  
Security Awareness Training: Insider threat.  
Monitoring for information disclosure:  Use 
of automated tools, review of monitored 
sites.   Protection of information at Rest: 
cryptographic protection.  Transmission 
Confidentiality and Integrity:  Cryptographic 
protection.  Personnel Termination & Access 
Agreements:  post-employment requirements. Medium 
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14 4 5 20 2 
Malware installation, 
e.g. by phishing emails 
/ social engineering 
Least Privilege:  Prohibit non-privileged 
users from executed privileged functions.  
Security Awareness Training:  Practical 
exercises for phishing, social engineering.  
Least functionality:  prevent program 
execution, unauthorised 
software/blacklisting.  Software usage 
restrictions: open source software.  User-
installed software:  alerts for unauthorised 
installations, prohibit installation without 
privileged status.  Malicious Code Protection: 
updates only by privileged users, detect 
unauthorised commands.  Information 
System Monitoring:  inbound and outbound 
communications traffic.  Spam Protection: 
central management, continuous learning 
capability. Low 
15.10 5 4 20 2 
TLS - Implementation 
issues – even when 
TLS is properly 
specified, the 
implementation can be 
incorrect, for example 
there are well known 
issues with OpenSSL, 
such as Heartbleed.  
The implementations 
can omit validating 
server certificates for 
example. 
Implement the mitigations in the RFC.  
Ensure implementations are kept-up to date 
so latest vulnerability fixes are in place.  
Malicious Code Protection:  Updates only by 
privileged users.  Flaw Remediation:  
Removal of previous versions of 
software/firmware. Low 
18 4 5 20 2 
Email misuse, either 
deliberate or 
accidental by an 
insider 
Access Enforcement: role-based access 
control.  Revocation of access authorizations.  
Security Awareness Training: Insider threat.  
Monitoring for information disclosure:  Use 
of automated tools, review of monitored 
sites.  Transmission Confidentiality and 
Integrity:  Cryptographic protection. Medium 
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19 4 5 20 2 
Deliberate or 
accidental tampering 
with of non-network 
connected devices. 
Maintenance Personnel: restrict individual 
movement on premises without appropriate 
access.  Physical Access Control: lockable 
casings, tamper protection.  Supply Chain 
Protection:  acquisition methods.  Software, 
firmware and information integrity: tamper 
evident packaging,  Medium 
3 4 4 16 3 Omitted  Omitted – risk value less than 20  
1 5 3 15 4 Omitted   Omitted – risk value less than 20  
5 5 3 15 4 Omitted   Omitted – risk value less than 20  
8 5 3 15 4 Omitted   Omitted – risk value less than 20  
10 5 3 15 4 Omitted   Omitted – risk value less than 20  
13 3 5 15 4 Omitted   Omitted – risk value less than 20  
17 3 5 15 4 Omitted   Omitted – risk value less than 20  
23 5 3 15 4 Omitted   Omitted – risk value less than 20  
4 5 2 10 5 Omitted   Omitted – risk value less than 20  
15.1 5 2 10 5 Omitted   Omitted – risk value less than 20  
15.2 5 2 10 5 Omitted   Omitted – risk value less than 20  
15.3 5 2 10 5 Omitted   Omitted – risk value less than 20  
15.4 5 2 10 5 Omitted   Omitted – risk value less than 20  
15.5 5 2 10 5 Omitted   Omitted – risk value less than 20  
15.6 5 2 10 5 Omitted   Omitted – risk value less than 20  
15.7 5 2 10 5 Omitted   Omitted – risk value less than 20  
15.8 5 2 10 5 Omitted   Omitted – risk value less than 20  
15.9 5 2 10 5 Omitted   Omitted – risk value less than 20  
11 3 3 9 6 Omitted   Omitted – risk value less than 20  
6 5 1 5 7 Omitted   Omitted – risk value less than 20  
22 5 1 5 7 Omitted   Omitted – risk value less than 20  
24 5 1 5 7 Omitted   Omitted – risk value less than 20  
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Appendix E – The NIST Risk Management Framework (RMF) 
 
 
 
Appendix F – The NIST families of controls 
 
NIST Families of Controls 
Access Control Media Protection 
Awareness Training 
Physical and 
Environmental 
Protection 
Audit and 
Accountability Planning 
Security Assessment 
and Authorization Personnel Security 
Configuration 
Management Risk Assessment 
Contingency Planning 
System and Services 
Acquisition 
Identification and 
Authentication 
System and 
Communications 
Protection 
Incident Response 
System and Information 
Integrity 
Maintenance Program Management 
 
